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Abstract 
In most wholesale electricity markets generators must submit step-function offers of 
supply to a uniform price auction, and the market is cleared at the price of the most 
expensive offer needed to meet realised demand. Such markets can most elegantly be 
modelled as the pure-strategy, Nash Equilibrium of continuous supply functions, in 
which each supplier has a unique profit maximising choice of supply function given the 
choices of other suppliers. Critics argue that the discreteness and discontinuity of the 
required steps can rule out pure-strategy equilibria and may result in price instability. 
This paper argues that if prices must be selected from a finite set the resulting step 
function converges to the continuous supply function as the number of steps increases, 
reconciling the apparently very disparate approaches to modelling electricity markets. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper fills an increasingly embarrassing gap between theory and reality in multi-bid 
auction markets such as electricity wholesale markets. The leading equilibrium theory 
underpinning market analysis and the econometric estimation of strategic bidding 
behaviour in electricity auctions assumes that generating companies offer a piecewise 
differentiable supply function, specifying the amounts they are willing to supply at each 
price. The market operator aggregates these supplies and clears the market at the lowest 
price at which supply is equal to demand – the Market Clearing Price (MCP). Generators 
on this theory choose their offers by optimising against the smooth residual demand, 
which gives well-defined first-order conditions. In reality, wholesale markets require 
offers to take the form of a step function, and the resulting residual demand facing any 
generator is also a step function, whose derivative is zero almost everywhere.  
Faced with this, economists have chosen either to model the market as a discrete 
unit auction, which typically leads to complex mixed strategy equilibria, or have argued 
that with enough steps, the residual demand can be smoothed and then treated as 
differentiable. The difference between these approaches appears dramatic, and it is the 
purpose of this paper to demonstrate that in a well-defined sense it can be legitimate to 
approximate step-functions by smooth differentiable functions, and hence to draw on the 
well-developed theory associated with continuous supply functions.  
To prove this result, we develop a new discrete model that has a pure-strategy 
equilibrium, which converges to the equilibrium of the limit game with continuous 
supply functions. Similar to Dahlquist/Lax-Richtmyer’s equivalence theorem (LeVeque, 
2007), convergence requires that the discrete system is consistent with the continuous 
system – the first-order conditions of the two systems converge - and that the discrete 
solution is stable, i.e. the difference between the two solutions does not grow at each 
step. Moreover, solutions should exist and globally maximize profits of the agents in both 
the discrete and continuous system.  
To our knowledge we are the first to prove convergence of equilibria in multi-
unit auctions to equilibria in divisible good auctions in this rigorous manner. The new 
discrete model can be useful for other purposes. For example, it has the potential to 
enhance the accuracy in econometric studies of bidding in auctions, as our discrete model 
sidesteps the problem of how to smooth stepped residual demand curves, which has been 
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a somewhat arbitrary and therefore disputed process in previous empirical studies of 
electricity auctions. 
1.1 Modelling electricity markets 
Electricity liberalisation typically creates a number of wholesale electricity markets. The 
balancing market is needed to secure real-time balancing services, to ensure that supply 
and demand can be instantaneously matched. The day-ahead or spot market provides 
hourly or half-hourly prices for adjusting contract positions, which themselves are traded 
in over-the-counter (OTC) or futures markets.  If traders are competitive and the markets 
liquid, there should be a close relationship between the contract, spot and balancing 
prices, otherwise profitable arbitrage would be possible. In such cases one can talk about 
a single wholesale spot price.  
The two key markets that we wish to model are the day-ahead market and the 
balancing market (in the English Electricity Pool they were combined). In most such 
markets there is a separate auction for each delivery period, which is typically a half-hour 
or hour. Normally, the post-2001 British balancing mechanism being an exception, the 
markets are organised as uniform price auctions. Thus all accepted bids and offers pay or 
are paid the market clearing price (MCP) and all purchase bids with a price limit higher 
than the MCP and all sales offers with a price limit lower than the MCP are executed. 
Rationing of excess supply at the clearing price may be necessary and so market designs 
must specify how rationing will take place, normally by pro-rata on-the-margin rationing 
(Kremer and Nyborg, 2004a). 
Producers submit non-decreasing step function offers to the auction (and in some 
markets agents, normally retailers, may submit non-increasing demands). With its offer 
the producer states how much power it is willing to generate at each price. The 
Amsterdam Power Exchange (APX) provides a good example and the bid and offer 
ladders that determine the MCP can be readily downloaded.5 The successive offers 
specify a quantity that would be available at a fixed per unit price. The smallest step in 
the ladder is given by the number of allowed decimals in the offer. Thus all prices and 
quantities in an offer have to be a multiple of the price tick size and quantity multiple, 
respectively. Table 1 summarizes these and other offer constraints for some of the 
 
5 At http://www.apxgroup.com/marketdata/powernl/public/aggregated_curves/curves.html. 
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electricity markets in U.S. and Europe. In particular it is worth noting that most 
electricity markets have significantly more possible quantity levels compared with 
possible price levels. In that sense, the quantity multiple is small relative to the price tick 
size. Most markets also have a constraint on the maximum number of allowed steps per 
bidder. Typically the number of units or gensets is very large in electricity markets, (over 
200 in Britain) so even if only 3-5 steps per unit is allowed, there can still be many steps 
in the market.   
 
Table 1: Constraints on the supply functions in various electricity markets.  
Market Installed 
capacity 
Max 
steps 
Price  
range 
Price 
 tick size 
Quantity 
multiple  
No. 
quantities/ 
No. prices  
Nord Pool 
spot 
90,000 
MW 
64 per 
bidder 
0-5,000 
NOK/MWh 
0.1 
NOK/MWh 
0.1 MWh 18 
ERCOT 
balancing 
70,000 
MW 
40 per 
bidder 
-$1,000/MWh-
$1,000/MWh 
$0.01/MWh 0.01 
MWh 
35 
PJM 160,000 
MW 
10 per 
genset 
0-$1,000/MWh $0.01/MWh 0.01 
MWh 
160 
UK (NETA) 80,000 
MW 
5 per 
genset 
-₤9,999/MWh- 
₤9,999/MWh 
₤0.01/MWh 0.001 
MWh 
4 
Spain Intra-
day market 
46,000 
MW 
5 per 
genset 
Yearly cap on 
revenues 
€0.01/MWh 0.1 MWh — 
 
Offers are submitted ahead of time (typically the day before) and may have to be 
valid for an extended period (e.g. 48 half-hour periods in the English Pool) during which 
demand can vary significantly. Plant may fail suddenly, requiring replacement at short 
notice, so the residual demand (i.e. the total demand less the supply accepted at each 
price from other generators) may shift suddenly with an individual failure, again 
increasing the range over which offers are required. 
Green and Newbery (1992) argued that the natural way to model such a market 
was to adapt Klemperer and Meyer's (1989) supply function equilibrium (SFE) 
formulation, in which firms make offers before the realization of demand is revealed. 
Units of electricity are assumed to be divisible, so firms offer continuous supply 
functions (SFs) to the auction. Accordingly, residual demand is piece-wise differentiable 
and firms have a well-defined piece-wise continuous marginal revenue, which offers 
the prospect of a well-defined best response function at each point. An equilibrium is 
such that each firm ensures that given the supplies offered by all other firms, it is 
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maximising its profits for each realization of demand.  
With a uniform price auction and a continuous SF the effect of lowering the 
price to capture the marginal unit lowers the price for the large quantity of 
inframarginal units (the ‘price’ effect) while only capturing an infinitesimal sale (the 
‘quantity’ effect). As a result very collusive supply function equilibria can be 
supported.  
The first order conditions for the Nash equilibrium for each demand realization 
satisfy a set of linked differential equations, which under various simplifying 
assumptions can be solved analytically, although for realistic specifications of costs 
numerical integration is normally required (Anderson and Hu, 2008; Baldick and 
Hogan, 2002; Holmberg, 2008). This approach opened the way for a large number of 
papers deriving solutions under various assumptions. Analytical solutions can be found 
for the case of equal and constant marginal costs and linear marginal costs.6 Closed form 
solutions are also available for symmetric firms and perfectly inelastic demand 
(Rudkevich et al, 1998; Anderson and Philpott, 2002). The literature on numerical 
algorithms for finding SFE of markets with asymmetric firms and general cost functions 
(Holmberg, 2008; Anderson and Hu, 2008) is particularly relevant to our investigation. 
For example, numerical instabilities often arise in computation especially when mark-ups 
are small (Baldick and Hogan, 2002; Holmberg, 2008). Our analysis amplifies this 
observation, namely, the relationship we establish between the discrete and 
continuous cases relies on mark-ups that are positive and bounded away from zero. 
Finally, the SFE model has also been extended to account for transmission constraints 
(Wilson, 2008).  
Green and Newbery (1992) argued that the large number of possible steps 
meant that, given the uncertainty about, and variability of, demand, such steps could 
reasonably be approximated by continuous and piecewise differentiable functions. 
von der Fehr and Harbord (1993), however, argued that the ladders were step 
functions that were not continuously differentiable, and it would be inappropriate to 
 
6  In general there is a continuum of equilibria bounded above and below, although these 
collapse to a unique equilibrium under certain conditions, such as free entry or limited 
capacity (Newbery, 1998, Holmberg, 2007). For the case of linear marginal costs, there is a 
unique linear SF equilibrium, (Klemperer and Meyer, 1989; Green, 1996; Baldick et al., 2004) 
although the general analytic solution can still be characterised as a closed form solution and 
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assume that they were. Instead, their paper models the electricity market as a 
multiple-unit auction. Costs were assumed to be common knowledge.  Each genset 
could submit a single bid for its entire capacity (and so quantities submitted are 
chosen from a discrete set). The bid is selected from a continuum of prices (although 
in all existing electricity markets the set of prices is finite). Demand was perfectly 
inelastic up to a price cap and drawn from a probability distribution with finite 
support, and the market price was set at the bid of the marginal unit called to meet 
demand, as in a uniform-price auction.   
The authors specifically contrasted this with the Green and Newbery supply 
function approach. The contrast was sharp - a step function (or ladder) of bids combined 
with inelastic demand gives rise to a residual demand schedule facing any bidder that is 
also a step function, and whose marginal revenue is either at the residual demand price or 
is discontinuous at the steps. Competition is therefore almost everywhere in prices, with 
winner takes all over the whole step. Thus the ‘price’ effect, which can be made 
infinitesimally small in their model, of stealing some market is no longer larger than the 
now significant ‘quantity’ effect. Not surprisingly such Bertrand competition often 
destroys any pure strategy, and if demand uncertainty is sufficiently large the only 
equilibrium has mixed strategies in which the firms randomise over a distribution of 
possible prices. As these equilibria are hard to solve, the examples typically only have 
one step, so the step lengths are large, as are the supports of the price distributions. 
Solving for the mixed strategy equilibrium with a more realistic number of steps proved 
extremely difficult, so the result was destructive, in the sense that existing supply 
function models were claimed to be flawed but suitable auction models were intractable.  
In a similar spirit, Supatgiat, Zhang and Birge (2001) build a step-function model 
motivated by the special Californian PX market design, a multi-round non-sealed bid 
auction. Generators submit a single price offer chosen from a set of possible price levels 
for their entire output, so that the number of rounds is not to increase unreasonably before 
convergence. Generators are assumed to be non-pivotal, so the solution is typically close 
to a Bertrand equilibrium at each step, although they cannot rule out multiple equilibria 
nor mixed strategies when demand is stochastic.  
In a subsequent paper, Fabra, von de Fehr and Harbord (2006) extended their 
 
solved numerically (Newbery, 2002; 2008). 
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analysis in various important directions, although (for the most part) under an extremely 
strong restriction on the timing of demand realization. Whereas the 1993 model was, 
plausibly, one in which the bids were submitted before the realization of demand, in this 
later paper the bids are made after the realization of demand. With two firms with 
variable costs c1 ≤ c2 = c facing a price cap P, and each submitting a single bid for the 
whole of their capacity, the pure strategy equilibrium is readily found. If demand is low 
enough for either firm to supply the entire market, the equilibrium is Bertrand (price p = 
c). If both firms are required to meet demand, one of them offers its supply at the price 
cap, p = P, while the other supplier submits an offer price sufficiently low so as to make 
undercutting unprofitable. This simple model is extended to allow multiple bids (bin, kin), 
where bin is the n-th bid of generator i for an amount kin. This allows a step function bid 
for each generator that might be expected to more closely match a smooth supply 
function. The authors also extend the model to allow long-lived but single bids with 
varying demand. Not surprisingly, this has an effect only when both low and high 
demand realizations occur with positive probability (i.e. cover the range where either the 
capacity of only one or both firms are required to meet demand). In such cases demand 
variability or uncertainty destroys all pure strategy equilibria, leaving a unique mixed-
strategy equilibrium in which both suppliers submit bids that strictly exceed c. It is 
possible (but difficult) to compute the mixed strategy equilibrium when both suppliers 
have the same capacity (but possibly different costs). 
Choosing a mixed strategy in prices means that prices will be inherently volatile 
or unstable, even if exactly the same demand is realised each day at the same time with 
the same generating sets available for dispatch and the same level of contract cover. It is 
clearly the case that spot prices are indeed very volatile, even at the same level of realised 
demand as can be seen by plotting prices against generation output, that can be 
downloaded from various power exchange websites. It is not unusual for prices to vary 
by a factor of 10 for the same level of output. Nevertheless, there are many explanations 
for such volatility apart from suppliers randomising over price offers. Most power 
exchanges such as the APX are effectively residual markets in which contract portfolio 
positions are adjusted to expected supply and demand. As contract positions, demand, 
imports and exports, as well as plant availability, vary over short periods of time, so will 
the necessity of buying and selling in the APX and hence so would the position of a 
 8
smooth SF (if such were allowed). One can see this visually by looking at successive 
days’ bid and offer ladders from e.g. the APX web site. 
 Despite the theoretical problem pointed out by von der Fehr and colleagues, 
three empirical studies of the balancing market in Texas (ERCOT) suggest that the 
continuous representation is approximately correct in describing the behaviour of the 
largest producers in this market (Niu et al., 2005; Hortacsu and Puller, 2008; Sioshansi 
and Oren, 2007). Sweeting (2007) similarly estimates best responses to realizations of a 
smoothed residual demand schedule in the English Electricity Pool and is able to 
convincingly characterise the various phases of market evolution and the exercise of 
market power. Wolak (2001) has also used observed bidding behaviour to back out the 
unobserved underlying cost and contract positions of generators bidding into the 
Australian market. He notes that continuity of the SF allows each price quantity pair to 
be a best response and hence does not depend on the distribution of shocks, whereas the 
choice of an optimal step function will depend on the distribution of the shocks, and can 
only be an approximation to the continuous representation. Nevertheless Wolak is 
content to smooth the ex post observed stepped residual demand schedule to compute its 
derivative and hence find the best response supply, which is then compared with the 
actual supply (chosen before the residual demand was realised).  
These empirical papers all start with the observed outcome to test whether 
generators are maximising their profits and, explicitly or implicitly accept the key 
assumptions underlying the SFE model, because residual demand is smoothened and it is 
assumed that producers use pure-strategies, so that producers know their competitors’ 
offer functions. They can reach no conclusions on whether the market is in equilibrium, 
or whether the recovered supply functions would give rise to an equilibrium, especially, 
as there is significant arbitrariness in how to smooth the observed residual demand of a 
producer. 
 
1.2 Reconciling step and continuous supply functions 
The central question raised by these criticisms and empirical applications is whether 
smoothing and/or increasing the number of steps in the ladder, combined with the need to 
bid before demand is realised, can reconcile the discrete and continuous approaches to 
modelling electricity markets. Do markets with uncertain or variable demand and 
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sufficiently finely graduated bidding ladders converge to supply function equilibria, or do 
they remain resolutely and significantly different? The central claim of this paper is that 
under well-defined conditions, convergence can be assured, providing an intellectually 
solid basis for accepting the SFE approach. As such it marks a major step forward in the 
theory of supply function equilibria. We also conjecture that there may be a wider class 
of cases in which convergence can be established, but leave that for further investigation. 
Fabra et al (2006) argue that the difference between the two approaches derives 
from the finite benefit of infinitesimal price undercutting in the ladder model. But this 
argument assumes that prices can be infinitely finely varied. In practice, the price tick 
size cannot be less than the smallest unit of account (e.g. 1 US cent, 1 pence, normally 
per MWh), and might be further restricted, as in the multi-round California PX auction. 
In this case, the undercutting strategy is not necessarily profitable, because the price 
reduction cannot be made arbitrarily small. Whereas von der Fehr and Harbord (1993) 
considered the extreme case when the set of quantities is finite and the set of prices is 
infinite, this paper considers the other extreme when the set of quantities is infinite and 
the set of prices is finite. Our assumption concurs with the observation in Section 1.1 that 
the quantity multiple is often small relative to the price tick size. Restrictions on the 
number of allowed steps per bidder/production unit might be important for determining 
the equilibrium as well, but this issue is left for future research. We show that, with 
sufficiently many allowed steps in the bid curves, the step function and the market-
clearing price (MCP) generally converge to the supply functions and price predicted by 
the SFE model. As in Dahlquist/Lax-Richtmyer’s equivalence theorem (LeVeque, 2007), 
convergence requires that the discrete system is consistent with the continuous system – 
the first-order conditions of the two systems converge - and that the discrete solution is 
stable, i.e. the difference between the two solutions does not grow at each step.  
Moreover, solutions should exist and globally maximize profits of the agents in both the 
discrete and continuous system. The use of the Dahlquist/Lax-Richtmyer’s equivalence 
theorem is a standard procedure when analyzing convergence of numerical methods, but 
it seems that we are the first to apply this theorem to the convergence of Nash equilibria. 
  Our existence and convergence result suggest that with a negligible quantity multiple 
and sufficiently many steps, discrete supply functions are deterministic (and hence so is 
the price for each realization, cet. par.) and a continuous supply function equilibrium is a 
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valid approximation of bidding in such electricity auctions. 
Our model has parallels in the theoretical work by Anderson and Xu (2004). 
They analyse a duopoly model that reflects two important features of the Australian 
electricity market, in which prices and quantities are specified separately. They 
assume demand is random but inelastic, with an elastic outside supply at some price, 
P, which effectively sets a price ceiling. At the day-ahead stage, each of two 
generators simultaneously chooses ten prices, which are then published. Subsequently 
(nearer to the time of dispatch) each generator decides how much to offer at each of 
its chosen prices. Demand is then realised and both generators are paid the MCP. 
Anderson and Xu are able to show that, under certain conditions, the second stage has 
a pure strategy equilibrium in quantities, although the first stage only has mixed 
strategies in the choice of prices. The second stage of their game has similarities with 
our model, because prices are discrete in both models. On the other hand, generators’ 
chosen price vectors generally differ as the declared prices are chosen by randomising 
over a continuous range of prices. In our paper, however, the available price levels are 
given by the market design and accordingly are the same for all firms. Moreover, 
Anderson and Xu (2004) do not compare their discrete equilibrium with a continuous 
SFE.  
Wolak (2004) develops a similar model of the Australian market to that of 
Anderson and Xu, but Wolak derives a best response rather than an equilibrium, and 
each producer is assumed to know both competitors’ selected price grid and their 
offers when making its own offer. The model by Wolak (2004) is quasi-discrete in the 
sense that residual demand of the analysed producer is smoothed by an algorithm that 
involves arbitrary parameters, before the best response is calculated. This model is 
applied empirically to recover the cost function of a producer from observed bids. The 
same model is used by Gans and Wolak (2007) to assess the impact of vertical 
integration between a large electricity retailer and a large electricity generator in the 
Australian market. A problem with the arbitrary smoothing is that it introduces 
several degrees of freedom in the empirical model, and it has even been claimed that 
the model becomes so general that the first-order condition of a producer cannot be 
rejected.  
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Anderson and Hu (2008) study an auction in which supply functions submitted 
and the residual demand function are continuous. To numerically calculate 
approximate equilibria of the continuous system, they approximate continuous supply 
functions with piece-wise linear supply functions and discretise the demand 
distribution. They show that equilibria of this approximation converge to equilibria in 
the original continuous model. The piece-wise linear bid functions are carefully 
chosen to avoid the influence of kinks in the residual demand curves.  These 
approximate bid curves are drawn so that all producers have locally well-defined 
derivatives in their residual demand curves for all possible discrete demand 
realizations. Anderson and Hu’s discrete model is motivated by its computational 
properties. By contrast we deal with the worst kinks possible, i.e. steps, and we do so 
explicitly. Because we want to prove equilibrium convergence for a more problematic 
case, which is relevant for real electricity markets where convergence has been 
disputed both empirically and theoretically.   
Kastl (2008) analyzes divisible-good auctions with certain demand and private 
values, i.e. bidders have incomplete information. This set-up, which was introduced 
by Wilson (1979), is mainly used to analyze treasury auctions.  Kastl considers both 
uniform-price and discriminatory auctions. He assumes that both quantities and prices 
are chosen from continuous sets, but the maximum number of steps is restricted. He 
verifies consistency, i.e. that the first-order condition (the Euler condition) of the 
stepped bid curve converges to the first-order condition of a continuous bid-curve 
when the number of steps becomes unbounded.  But he does not verify stability, nor 
that solutions exists and globally maximize agents’ profits in the discrete and 
continuous systems, which all are necessary conditions for the  convergence of Nash 
equilibria in the discrete system to Nash equilibria in the continuous systems.  
   More generally, the convergence problem under study is related to the 
seminal paper by Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) on games with discontinuous profits. 
They show that if payoffs are discontinuous, then Nash equilibria in games with finite 
approximations of the strategy space of a limit game may not necessarily converge to 
Nash equilibria of the limit game. Later Simon (1987) showed that convergence may 
depend on how the strategy space is approximated. This intuitively explains why NE in 
the model by von der Fehr and Harbord (1993), in which payoffs are discontinuous, 
do not necessarily converge to continuous SFE, and also why it is not surprising that 
NE in our discrete model, in which payoffs are continuous, converge to continuous 
SFE. However, Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) and Simon (1987) derive their 
convergence results for a limit game in which the strategy space has a finite dimension. 
Thus they do not consider the stability property, which is often important when the limit 
game has infinitely many dimensions (a continuous supply function has infinitely many 
price/quantity pairs).         
 
2 THE MODEL AND ANALYSIS 
Consider a uniform price auction and assume that excess supply is rationed pro-rata 
on-the-margin. We calculate a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of a one-shot game, in 
which each risk-neutral electricity producer, i, chooses a step supply function to 
maximise its expected profit, ( )iπE . There are M price levels, pj, j=1,2,…M, with the 
price tick ∆pj = pj - pj-1. In most of our analysis price levels are assumed to be 
equidistant and then we let ∆p denote the price tick-size. The minimum quantity 
increment is zero - quantities can be continuously varied. 
Generator i (i=1,..,N) submits a supply vector si consisting of maximum 
quantities { }Mii ss ,,1 K  it is willing to produce at each price level { }Mpp ,,1 K . The step 
lengthΔ ≥ 0: offers must be non-decreasing in price and bounded above 
by the capacity 
1−−= jiji ssjis
is  of Generator i. Let { }N1 sss ,,K=  and denote competitors’ 
collective quantity offers at price pj as  and the total market offer as sj. In the 
continuous model the set of individual supply functions is 
js−i
( ){ }Nii ps st function 
of firm i, ( )ii sC , is ooth, increasing and convex function up to the capacity 
constraint 
1= . The co
 a sm
is . Costs are common knowledge. Electricity consumers are non-strategic. 
Their demand is stepped and the minimum demand at each price is ε+jd , whe s 
an additive demand shock. Decremental demand is =Δ jd
Δ jd sponding to a continuously differentiable concave deterministic 
demand curve, d(p), in the continuous case. The latter is such that 
re ε i
, with 
r
01 ≤− −jj dd
1+j , coΔ≥ d re
( )
j
j
pdd
j
'lim =Δ  jp p0 Δ→Δ
and ( )jj dd =p j→Δ  lim0 p . Note that ∆pj is a local tick-size and that other tick-sizes ∆pk are 
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demand s
fixed when these limits are calculated, so that pj is fixed and 1+→ jj pp . The additive 
hock has a continuous non-zero probability density, g(ε), with support 
on [ ]. ,εε   
Let be the total deterministic net supply (excluding the stochastic 
shock) at price pj, and define the increase in net supply from a positive increment in price 
as . Similarly, the residual deterministic net supply is  and 
its increase is .   
jjj ds −=τ
1−− jj τ
−− −=Δ jiji ττ
=Δ j ττ jji ds −= −ji−τ
( jτε −∈
1−
−
j
iτ
Min
shock
Max
shock
pL
pH
pM
pL+1
pH-1
Price
Quantity
Shock
probability
1−Lτ
ε
Deterministic net-
supply in the market
∆p
1+Lτ
ε
1−Hτ Hτ
 
Figure 1. Stepped supply, demand shocks and key price levels. 
 
The Market Clearing Price (MCP) is the lowest price at which the deterministic 
net-supply equals the stochastic demand shock. Thus the equilibrium price as a function 
of the demand shock is left continuous, and the MCP equals pj if Given 
chosen step functions, the market clearing price can be calculated for each demand shock 
]. ,1 jτ
in the interval [ ]. ,εε  The lowest and highest prices that are realized are denoted by pL 
and pH, respectively, where 1 ≤ L < H ≤ M. Both depend on the available number of price 
levels, M, as well as the initial (or boundary) conditions, and these various price levels 
and the demand shocks are shown in Figure 1. The lowest and highest realized prices in 
the corresponding continuous system are a and b respectively. 
2.1 First-order conditions 
With pro-rata on-the-margin rationing, all supply offers below the MCP, pj, are 
accepted, while offers at pj are rationed pro-rata. Thus for ( ]jj ττε ,1−∈ ,  is 
excess demand at pj-1, so the accepted supply of a generator i is given by: 
1−− jτε
 ( ) ( ) ( ),1111 j jjijij jjijii sss τ τεττετ τεε Δ −Δ−−=Δ −Δ+=
−
−−
−
−
−  (1) 
(making use of the fact that  and ). Hence, the 
contribution to the expected profit of generator i from realizations  is: 
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where again . Generator i’s total expected profit is ji
j
i
j s+= −ττ
( )( ) ( 1
1
,E −
=
∑= jijiM
j
j
ii ssEsπ ).  (3) 
The Nash equilibrium is found by deriving the best response of each firm given its 
competitors’ chosen stepped supply functions. The first order conditions are found by 
differentiating the expected profit in (3). Proposition 1 characterises these first order 
conditions over the range of possible intersections of aggregate supply with demand (i.e. 
over the range on which it has positive probability). All proofs are given in the appendix. 
Proposition 1. With discrete supply function offers, ( ) ( )( ) jiiji s∂∂=Γ /E ss π  is always 
well-defined, and the first-order condition for the supply of firm i at a price level j, 
such that ετε ≤≤ j , is given by: 
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where si(ε) is given by (1) if [ ]. ,1 jj ττε −∈  
The first point to note, pace Dasgupta and Maskin’s (1986) result for games 
with discontinuous profits, is that expected profits ( )( )siπE  are differentiable. Thus 
expected profit is continuous in the strategy variables, and convergence should be less 
problematic. The first-order condition can be intuitively interpreted as follows. When 
calculating , supply is increased at pj, while holding the supply 
at all other price levels constant. This implies that the offer price of one 
(infinitesimally small) unit of power is decreased from pj+1 to pj. This decreases the 
MCP for the event when the unit is price-setting, i.e. when ε=τj. This event brings a 
negative contribution to the expected profit, which corresponds to the first term in the 
first-order condition. On the other hand, because of the rationing mechanism, 
decreasing the price of one unit (weakly) increases the supply for demand outcomes 
This brings a positive contribution to the expected profit, which 
corresponds to the two integrals in the first-order condition. The first integral 
represents when the MCP is pj, and the other integral represents  
 when the MCP is pj+1. 
( ) ( )( ) jiiji s∂∂=Γ /E ss π
]. 1+j
( ] ,1 jj ττε −∈
]1+
( ,1−∈ j ττε
( ,∈ jj ττε
 The first-order condition in Proposition 1 is not directly applicable to parts of the offer 
curve that are always or never accepted in equilibrium. The appendix shows that, because 
of pro-rata rationing, a producer’s profit is maximized if offers that are never accepted 
are offered with a perfectly elastic supply (until the capacity constraint binds) at pH, so 
that  iHi ss = ,  and offers that are always accepted are offered below pL. In particular, we 
assume that 
  if j < L,   (5) 1−= Liji ss
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because this offer curve discourages NE deviations that undercut the price level pL.  
In summary, equilibrium supply is constant for p<pL, satisfies (4) for p∈ [pL, pH) 
and jumps to is  at pH. Definition 1 gives the notation for a set of solutions, meaning a list 
of simultaneous solutions, one for each player i and price level pj. 
Note that the difference equation in (4) is of the second-order. Thus solutions, 
should they exist, would be indexed by two boundary conditions that could appear in a 
variety of forms, e.g., initial and final (boundary) values or, as we shall do, two boundary 
values at the upper end of the interval. As argued above, one of the boundary conditions 
is pinned down by the capacity constraint iHi ss = . This leaves each firm with one 
remaining free parameter, , that will be tied down with a second boundary 
condition, , for some constant . This latter condition corresponds to the 
single boundary condition needed for the continuous case, presented shortly. 
1−H
is
i
H
i ks ˆ
1 =− ikˆ
Definition 1.  By { }{ }N
i
Hj
Lj
j
is 1=
=
=
) or { } NHLjis ,1,)  we denote a set of discrete solutions to the 
system of difference equations (4) given two boundary conditions iHi ss =)  and  
for some constant . We say this set is a segment of a discrete SFE if the set of 
strategies  formed by taking 
i
H
i ks ˆˆ
1 =−
ikˆ
{ } NHijjis , 1, = Liji ss )= if j<L and jiji ss )= if L ≤ j ≤ H is an SFE for 
the discrete game. 
Section 3 studies convergence of equilibria of the discrete system to equilibria of 
the continuous system. The system of first-order conditions in the continuous case is 
given by Klemperer and Meyer (1989):  
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) 0=⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ ′−′⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ ′−+− − pdpspsCpps iiii .   (6) 
This system has one degree of freedom, and hence an infinite number of potential 
solutions. As shown by Baldick and Hogan (2001), the system of differential equations 
can be written in the standard form of an ordinary differential equation (ODE): 
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
( )
( )( )∑ ′−−+′−−−=
′
k kk
k
ii
i
i
psCp
ps
NpsCp
ps
N
pdps
1
1
1
' .   (7) 
We can therefore index the continuum of continuous SFE by a boundary condition 
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k
( ) ii kbs =
k
. In Section 3, we will link the discrete and continuous boundary conditions by 
requiring , where we note that depends on ∆p or, equivalently, on M. ipi kˆlim0→Δ= iˆ
The assumed shape of the offer curves in the never-price-setting region is the 
same as for the discrete system; bids that are always accepted are perfectly inelastic and 
bids that are never accepted are perfectly elastic. This shape also discourages competitors 
from deviating from a potential NE, and is accordingly most supportive of an NE: 
  if p < a  and ( ) ( )asps ii = ( ) ii sps =  if p > b.   (8) 
The next definition provides the notation for solutions to the continuous system.   
Definition 2.  By ( ){ }Nii ps 1=)  we denote a set of continuous solutions to the system of the 
differential equations (7) on the interval [a,b].  We say ( ){ }Nii ps 1=)  is a segment of a 
continuous SFE if the set of strategies ( ){ }Nii ps 1=  formed by taking ( ) (asi )psi )=  if  p < a, 
( ) ( )psps ii )=  if p∈ [a,b],   and ( ) ii sbs =+  is an SFE. 
2.2 Sufficient conditions 
Here we show that a non-decreasing solution of either the discrete or continuous 
stationary conditions, presented above, must be an SFE if assumptions 1a and 2 
(discrete case) or 1b (continuous case) below are satisfied. That is, the non-decreasing 
condition acts rather like a second-order condition in ensuring sufficiency.  These 
results are of independent interest. For example, Proposition 3, on the sufficiency in 
the continuous case, extends the symmetric case presented in claim 7 and the text 
following in Klemperer and Meyer (1989).  
Assumption 1a.  A binding price cap, i.e. H=M, or sufficiently large production 
capacities, ensures that there is no producer in the discrete system that can increase its 
profit by decreasing its supply at pH . If there are unilateral deviations such that the 
price is higher than pH with a positive probability, then the profit of the deviating firm 
decreases by an amount bounded away from zero.  
The assumption is always satisfied for non-pivotal firms. In this case, no 
producer can unilaterally deviate and push the price above pH, as competitors offer all 
of their capacity at the price pH. Pivotal producers would be able to deviate and push 
the price above pH if H<M. Still Assumption 1a is satisfied if such deviations are 
strictly non-profitable, i.e. pH is sufficiently high or the firm is not sufficiently pivotal. 
If H=M, i.e. the price cap binds, then there is no limit on how pivotal the firms are 
allowed to be, assumption 1a is satisfied anyway. See Genc and Reynolds (2004) for a 
more detailed analysis of pivotal producers’ impact on the range of supply function 
equilibria. For technical reasons assumption 1a rules out borderline cases where there 
are withholding deviations that do not change pivotal producer’s profits. Given that 
the continuous and discrete solutions converge, we can use this technical condition to 
ensure that assumption 1a is satisfied if and only if assumption 1b (below) is satisfied, 
which is useful when we, in Section 3, verify convergence of the discrete and 
continuous equilibria, i.e. that global second-order conditions in the two systems have 
the same signs.  
Assumption 1b.  A binding price cap or sufficiently large production capacities 
ensures that there is no producer in the continuous system that can increase its profit 
by decreasing its supply at b. If there are unilateral deviations such that the price is 
higher than b with a positive probability, then the profit of the deviating firm 
decreases by an amount bounded away from zero.  
Generally ετ >H , so the first step of the stepped supply curve – as we move 
“backwards” from ε  toward ε  – is special. Typically the solution of the discrete system 
of equations would converge to a set of curves with significantly different slopes at pH-1 
and pH-2. To avoid this potential problem we make Assumption 2, which ensures that the 
discrete first-order condition of the highest-price step is consistent with the first-order 
conditions of the other steps, i.e. the set of first-order equations at step H-1 converges to 
the set of first-order equation at step H-2 as ∆p→0.  Details of this assumption appear in 
Lemma 2 in the Appendix.  
Assumption 2.  Given { } { }NiiNiHi ss 11 == =) , { } { }NiiNiHi ks 111 ˆˆ ==− = and { }Niik 1= , the discrete 
boundary values{ }  converges to their limit Niik 1ˆ = { }Niik 1=  in such a way that 
 as ∆p→0.  ( ){ } NNiHi 111 ==− Γ→Γ s ( ){ iHi 2− s }
 
The set of limits { }  may also serve as boundary conditions for a set of 
continuous solutions, as assumed in Section 3, but this is not necessary. Appendix 
N
iik 1=
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Lemma 2 shows that there is always at least one set of { }NiHis 11 =−)  for which Assumption 
2 is satisfied. 
Proposition 2 says that solutions of the first-order difference equations that are 
non-decreasing everywhere in the region of possible demand realizations are 
essentially discrete SFE. This result relies on the assumption that , i.e. 
concave demand.  
1+Δ≥Δ jj dd
Proposition 2  Consider a set { } NHLjis ,1,)  of solutions to the discrete first-order 
conditions (4) under the usual boundary conditions iHi ss =)  and . Suppose 
Assumption 1a and Assumption 2 hold. Suppose further that  
(where W is some positive constant) for j = L,…,H-1, and each i=1, …, N, 
independent of M. If the discrete strategy 
i
H
i ks ˆ
1 =−
ss ji
j
i −≤0 pWΔ≤−1
{ }HLjis) is non-decreasing for each generator i 
then, for sufficiently large M,  { } NHLjis ,1,) is a segment of a discrete SFE. 
The analogous sufficiency result for continuous SFE with concave demand is given by 
 
Proposition  3. Let Assumption 1b hold. If each ( )psi) is non-decreasing on [a,b] then 
( ){ }Nii ps 1=)  is a segment of a continuous SFE. 
3. CONVERGENCE OF DISCRETE AND CONTINUOUS SFE 
This section states (and the appendix proves) the central result of the paper: that for a 
market for which a continuous SFE exists, a discrete SFE also exists and converges to the 
continuous SFE as Δp → 0. The steps in the convergence proof are related to the steps in 
the proof of Dahlquist’s equivalence theorem7 for discrete approximations of ODEs 
(LeVeque, 2007).  Up to this point, the convergence proof is about first-order optimality, 
or stationary, conditions posed as ODEs. We then depart from the theory of ODEs in 
order to prove convergence of the equilibria themselves. Fortunately this turns out to 
follow relatively easily from convergence of the first-order solutions: if assumption 1b is 
satisfied and if demand is concave, then it can be shown that monotonically increasing 
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7 The more general Lax-Richtmyer equivalence theorem applies to partial differential 
equations.  
solutions to the continuous first-order conditions yield monotonicity of the discrete first-
order solutions, giving discrete SFE as described in Proposition 2. 
In order to avoid singularities in (5) when we later apply approximation theory 
for ODEs, we make:   
Assumption 3.  Initial values ( ){ }Nii bs 1=) and the support of the demand shocks [ ] ,εε are 
such that the set of solutions ( ){ }Ni 1=i ps) of (4) exists, are bounded, increasing and 
differentiable on the interval [a,b]. We also assume that the mark-up  is 
positive for each i and each p ∈ [a,b].
( )( )psCp ii )′−
8 
 We present our main result and then lay out the proof strategy; technicalities are 
relegated to the appendix. Our task is to relate continuous solutions to solutions of the 
discrete system (4). Recall also that pL and pH are the lowest and highest realized prices, 
and that the indices L and H vary with M (and the boundary conditions). 
Theorem 1.  Let Assumptions 1b and 3 hold,  then:  
a) ( ){ }Nii ps 1=) is a segment of a continuous SFE. 
b) In addition, suppose as M → ∞ that bpH → , and Assumption 2 
holds. Then there exists a set of solutions 
,apL →
{ } NHLjis ,1,) of the difference equations 
(4), under the usual boundary conditions iHi ss =)  and iHi k , that is a 
segment of a discrete SFE and converges to 
s ˆ1 =−
( ){ }Nii ps 1=)  in the interval [a,b] as 
M → ∞ . 
The meaning of convergence in this result is that if j is chosen to depend on M such 
that pj  → p ∈ [a,b] as M → ∞, then )( pss iji )) →  as M → ∞ for each i. 
One implication of Theorem 1 is that with a sufficient number of steps, 
existence of discrete SFE is ensured if a corresponding continuous SFE exists. As an 
example, Klemperer and Meyer (1989) establish the existence of continuous SF 
equilibria if firms are symmetric, ε has strictly positive density everywhere on its 
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8 This is a non-restrictive constraint, because profit-maximizing producers with a non-
negative output would never bid below their marginal cost, and solutions with prices below 
support [ ], ,εε the cost function is C2 and convex, and the demand function D(p, ε) is 
C2, concave and with a negative first derivative. 
 Before outlining the proof of Theorem 1, we mention two departures of this result 
from the literature. The first is a technical point, namely it is not standard to approximate 
ODEs by systems that are both non-linear and implicit (since solving an approximating 
system then requires an iterative procedure at each step of the integration). Nevertheless 
our convergence proof has to deal with systems of difference equations in Proposition 1 
that are implicit and non-linear; we extend the framework of Leveque (2007) for this 
purpose. Second, and more important, in the study of SFEs there is little if any work that 
relates ex ante discrete games to their continuous counterparts by convergence analysis. 
Recall how Anderson and Hu (2008) discretise a continuous SFE system in order to get a 
numerically convenient discrete system with straightforward convergence to the 
continuous solution. This is a (valuable) numerical scheme for approximating continuous 
SFE. By contrast, we start with a class of self-contained discrete games and demonstrate 
both existence and convergence of SFE for the discrete system to those of the continuous 
system. This is a hitherto missing bridge from continuous SFE theory to discrete SFE 
practice. 
 The first step in proving Theorem 1 is to verify that the discrete system of 
stationary conditions in Proposition 1 is consistent with the stationary conditions for 
continuous SFE written as the ODE (5). Lemma 4 of the appendix shows this to be the 
case by using the positive mark-up assumption to avoid a singularity in the equations at 
the point where mark-ups are zero.  
That the discrete system is a consistent approximation of the continuous one 
implies the former set of equations converges to the latter as the number of price steps M 
goes to infinity. Thus as M→∞, the second-order difference equation in (4) converges to 
a differential equation of the first-order, which corresponds to the Klemperer and Meyer 
equation. However, this does not ensure that a discrete solution will exist or, if it does, 
that it will converge to the continuous solution, because if the error increases at each step, 
it could explode when the number of steps becomes large – this describes what is called 
the unstable case. Hence the second step in the convergence analysis is to establish 
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the marginal cost would never constitute Nash equilibria. 
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)
existence and stability. Proposition 4 in the Appendix states that the discrete solution 
exists and is stable, and shows that the solution of the discrete first-order system does 
indeed converge to the solution of the continuous first-order system as M→∞. As an 
illustration of the discrepancy between consistency and convergence, the following can 
be noted: to prove consistency in our model it would have been enough to assume that 
 is bounded, which would allow for zero mark-ups when supply is 
zero. However, the error grows at an infinite rate when the mark-up is zero at zero 
supply, so the continuous and discrete solutions do not necessarily converge at this point. 
This is related to the instability near zero supply that has been observed when continuous 
SFE are calculated by means of standard numerical integration methods (Baldick and 
Hogan, 2002; Holmberg, 2008). 
( ) ( )( )/( psCpps iii )) ′−
Up to this point, the proof has shown existence and convergence of solutions of 
the discrete stationary conditions to those of the continuous stationary conditions. The 
final step of the convergence proof uses the observation that a stationary solution of 
either the discrete or continuous system is actually a Nash equilibrium strategy if it is 
increasing in price: see Propositions 2 and 3 in Section 2. It follows from the consistency 
property that if there is a continuously differentiable SFE with each player’s strategy 
having positive gradient for all p of interest (in a closed interval), then the 
discrete solution, for which 
( ) 0>′ psi)
( )ps
p
ss
i
j
j
i
j
i ′→Δ
−+ )1 , must also be increasing, and the proof of 
Theorem 1 is complete.  
Note that the convergence result is valid for general cost functions, asymmetric 
producers and general probability distributions of the demand shock.  From Proposition 1 
we know that the latter influences the first-order condition for a finite number of steps, 
but apparently this dependence disappears in the limit, as it does in the continuous case.  
Appendix Proposition 5 reverses the implication of Theorem 1 to show that if a 
solution of discrete first-order conditions is non-decreasing and converges to a set of 
smooth functions (one per player) with positive mark-ups, then the limiting set of 
functions is a continuous SFE.  That is, the family of increasing continuous SFE with 
positive mark-ups is asymptotically in one-to-one correspondence with the family of 
corresponding discrete SFE. This is in itself a useful contribution to existence results for 
continuous SFEs. 
3.1 Example 
Consider a market with two symmetric firms that have infinite production capacity. 
Each producer has linear increasing marginal costs C′i  = si.  Demand at each price 
level is by assumption given by ( ) jj ppD 5.0,
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−ε=ε . The demand shock, ε, is 
assumed to be uniformly distributed on the interval [1.5,3.5], i.e. g(ε) = 0.5 in this 
range.   
In the continuous case, there is a continuum of symmetric solutions to the first-
order condition in (6). The chosen solution depends on the end-condition. Klemperer and 
Meyer (1989) and Green and Newbery (1992) show that in the continuous case, the 
symmetric solution slopes upwards between the marginal cost curve and the Cournot 
schedule, while it slopes downwards (or backwards) outside this wedge. The Cournot 
schedule is the set of Cournot solutions that would result for all possible realizations of 
the demand shock, and the continuous SFE is vertical at this line (with price on the y-
axis). In the other extreme, when price equals marginal cost the solution becomes 
horizontal. Thus a continuous symmetric solution constitutes an SFE if and only if the 
solution is within the wedge for all realized prices. Fig. 2 plots the most and least 
competitive continuous SFE. All solutions of the differential equations (4) or (5) in-
between the most and least competitive continuous cases are also continuous SFE.9  
For the marginal cost and demand curves assumed in this example, the 
discrete first-order condition in Proposition 1 can be simplified to: 
 ( ) ( ) .02
32
12
32
1 11
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In a symmetric duopoly equilibrium with pd Δ−=Δ 5.0 , . 
Thus the first-order condition can be written: 
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9  The dotted continuous SFs are very close to the stepped SF and for the most competitive 
case are essentially indistinguishable. 
In Fig. 2 the discrete solutions with the same end-conditions as the most and least 
competitive SFE respectively are plotted. The offers at the price level H-1 have been 
calculated using boundary conditions given in Appendix Lemma 2, so that Assumption 2 
is satisfied. Thus with a sufficiently small ∆p these solutions will be discrete SFE 
according to Theorem 1, and so will all discrete solutions in-between them.  Our 
experience is that we need a much smaller tick-size in the most competitive case 
compared to the least competitive case in order to get a monotonic solution. We believe 
that it is related to that convergence is poorer when mark-ups are small due to the 
singularity at zero mark-ups.   
Figure 2.  The most and least competitive continuous SFE (dotted) and their 
discrete approximations (solid). The discrete approximations have a tick-size of 
∆p=0.05 (non-competive case) and ∆p=0.001 (competitive case).  
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3.3 Conjectured convergence in actual electricity markets 
Anderson and Xu (2008) only solve for a very simple example with two firms each 
choosing one price in the first stage of the Australian market, noting that to solve for 
the mixed strategy for multiple steps would be challenging. For similar reasons von 
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der Fehr and Harbord (1993) only consider mixed equilibria in which each firm chooses 
one price. An interesting conjecture is that if firms can choose a large but finite 
number of prices from a larger set of possible prices, then the range over which each 
price is sampled may shrink as the number of possible price choices increases, 
particularly if the prices themselves must be discrete. It may then be possible to 
demonstrate convergence of step SFEs to the continuous SFEs even when the possible 
price steps are smaller than the quantity steps. If so, the price instability at any level 
of demand would be small, and errors in using continuous representations also small. 
It follows from classical existence results that NE in finite approximations of a 
limit game converge to the NE in the limit game if the strategy space is finite-
dimensional, convex, compact and payoffs are continuous and quasi-concave 
(Dasgupta and Maskin, 1986; Simon, 1987). These results are not directly applicable 
to our case, as our limit game has an infinite-dimensional strategy space. But the 
general results can anyway be used to make very reasonable conjectures.. As the 
strategy space in the von der Fehr and Harbord model is convex and compact, it is our 
belief that their equilibrium fails to converge to a continuous SFE because of the 
payoff discontinuity; payoffs in their model can be significantly increased by slightly 
undercutting competitors’ offers. Thus we argue that the risk of price instability 
would be mitigated if payoffs could be made continuous. For example, if costs are 
private information to some extent as in Parisio and Bosco (2003), then uncertainty 
about competitors’ offers would make expected profits continuous. In spite of this 
additional uncertainty, we believe that pure-strategy equilibria in such a market can be 
approximated by a continuous SFE if demand uncertainty dominates uncertainty about 
competitor’s production costs.  
Further, it would be helpful if the market design did not require stepped offers. 
For example, Nord Pool (in the Nordic countries) and Powernext (in France) make a 
linear interpolation of volumes between each adjacent pair of submitted price steps. 
Anderson and Hu (2008) show that equilibria in such auctions converge to continuous 
SFE provided that the piece-wise linear offer curves are constructed to avoid the 
influence of kinks in residual demand. But we believe that their result is true for more 
general circumstances, as payoffs are continuous in such a market design, unless 
producers choose to make stepped offers. Continuous payoffs, because of piece-wise 
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linear offers or uncertainty about competitors’ production costs, are helpful but only 
guarantee convergence to SFE in the limit. To ensure price stability in a discrete 
system, an SFE must exist in the limit game, the quantity multiple needs to be 
sufficiently small, and the allowed number of steps sufficiently large.    
 
4  CONCLUSIONS 
Green and Newbery (1992), and Newbery (1998) assume that the allowed number of 
steps in the supply function bids of electricity auctions is so large that equilibrium bids 
can be approximated by continuous SFE.  This is a very attractive assumption, because it 
implies that a pure-strategy equilibrium can be calculated analytically for simple cases 
and numerically for general cost functions and asymmetric producers. The pure-strategy 
equilibrium that has inherently stable prices also justifies empirical approaches that 
enable observers to deduce contract positions, marginal costs and the price-cost mark-up 
from observed bids, as in Wolak (2001).  
von der Fehr and Harbord (1993), however, argue that as long as the number of 
steps is finite, then continuous SFE are not a valid representation of bidding in electricity 
auctions. Under the extreme assumption that prices can be chosen from a continuous 
distribution so that the price tick size is negligible, von der Fehr and Harbord (1993) 
show that uniform price electricity auctions have an inherent price instability. If demand 
variation is sufficiently large, so that no producer is pivotal at minimum demand and at 
least one firm is pivotal at maximum demand, then there are no pure strategy Nash 
equilibria, only mixed strategy Nash equilibria. The intuition behind the non-existence of 
pure strategy Nash equilibria is that producers slightly undercut each other’s step bids 
until mark-ups are zero. Whenever producers are pivotal they have profitable deviations 
from such an outcome. 
We claim that the von der Fehr and Harbord result is not driven by the stepped 
form of the supply functions, but rather by their discreteness assumption. We consider 
the other extreme in which the price tick size is significant and the quantity multiple 
is negligible. We show that in this case step equilibria converge to continuous supply 
function equilibria. The intuition for the existence of pure strategy equilibria is that 
with a significant price tick size, it is not necessarily profitable to undercut perfectly 
elastic segments in competitors’ bids.  
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Our results imply that the concern that electricity auctions have an inherent 
price instability and that they cannot be modelled by continuous SFE is not necessarily 
correct. We also claim that this potential problem can be avoided if tick sizes are such 
that the number of price levels is small compared to the number of quantity levels, which 
is the case in many electricity markets. To avoid price instability, we also recommend 
that restrictions in the number of steps should be as lax as possible, even if some 
restrictions are probably administratively necessary. Restricting the number of steps 
increases each producer’s incremental supply offered at each step, encouraging price 
randomisation.  
Our recommendation to have small quantity multiples contrasts with that of 
Kremer and Nyborg (2004b) who recommend a large minimum quantity increment 
relative to the price tick size to encourage competitive bidding. A problem with their 
analysis is that they only consider first-order conditions; they do not verify that pure-
strategy equilibria exist by checking second-order conditions. We believe that their 
recommendation is correct for markets in which bidders are non-pivotal for all 
demand realizations, because in such markets pure strategy equilibria with very low 
mark-ups are possible. For example, von der Fehr and Harbord’s (1993) model has a 
Bertrand equilibrium in this case. However, when one or several producers are pivotal 
for some demand realization, encouraging producers to undercut competitors’ bids can 
lead to non-existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria and not necessarily lower average 
mark-ups (von der Fehr and Harbord, 1993).  
Even if mark-ups would be lower also in this case, the market participants would 
bear the cost of uncertainty caused by the inherent price instability. As undercutting 
incentives are only problematic when producers are pivotal, it is possible that an optimal 
market design would have a price tick-size that increases with the price. This could be 
achieved by limiting the number of non-zero digits rather than the number of decimals in 
the bids, or by requiring a minimum percentage increment in successive prices, as in 
some multi-round auctions.  If this is an attractive option, it should be noted that the 
first-order condition in Proposition 1 is valid even if the tick size varies with the 
price.  
Because of a singularity at zero mark-up, equilibrium bid-curves tend to be 
numerically unstable and easily non-monotonic near such points (Baldick and Hogan, 
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2002; Holmberg, 2008). We have the same experience with our stepped offer curves. 
The policy implication is that smaller tick-sizes, and even smaller quantity multiples, 
are needed in competitive markets with small mark-ups in order to get stable prices   
 General convergence results for finite-dimensional games by Dasgupta and 
Maskin (1986) and Simon (1987) are not necessarily applicable to our problem, 
which is infinitely-dimensional in the limit. But their results suggest that the risk of 
non-convergence and price instability in electricity auctions would be lower if payoffs 
were continuous, for example by allowing piece-wise linear offers as in Nord Pool. 
Existence of continuous and discrete pure-strategy SFE is problematic if the demand 
curve is sufficiently convex or if production costs are sufficiently non-convex.   
 If an electricity market would fail to have a pure-strategy NE due to large 
quantity increments, then problems caused by instability might not be too severe for 
levels of demand when no generator is pivotal and the MCP were close to system 
marginal cost. We also conjecture that if mixed strategy equilibria occur, then the 
price instability at any level of demand would be small if there are many available 
price and quantity levels.  
Recently, it has been empirically verified that large producers in the balancing 
market of Texas (ERCOT) approximately bid in accordance with the first-order condition 
for continuous supply functions (Niu et al., 2005; Hortascu and Puller, 2007; Sioshansi 
and Oren, 2007).  It is possible that the new discrete model could improve the accuracy 
of such empirical studies, because the new first-order condition considers the 
influence by the demand uncertainty on stepped offers. This effect has previously 
been considered by Wolak (2004) in an empirical analysis of the Australian market, 
but this market is quite different from most other markets, as producers choose their 
own price grid in Australia.  Moreover, our discrete model side-steps the problem of 
how to smooth the residual demand curve. The smoothing process has been a 
somewhat arbitrary and therefore disputed part of previous empirical studies, which 
rely on continuous or quasi-discrete models (Wolak, 2004) of bidding in the 
electricity market.  In case discrete NE are useful as a method of numerically 
calculating approximate SFE, it should be noticed that  the assumed price tick size 
does not necessarily have to correspond to the tick size of the studied auction. In a 
numerically efficient solver, it might be of interest to vary the tick size with the price.  
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We show that never-accepted out-of-equilibrium bids of rational producers are 
perfectly elastic in uniform-price procurement auctions with stepped supply functions 
and pro-rata on-the-margin rationing. This theoretical prediction can be used to 
empirically test whether producers in electricity auctions believe that some of their 
offers are accepted with zero-probability, which is assumed in many theoretical 
models of electricity auctions. A by-product of our analysis is the result that any set 
of, not necessarily symmetric, solutions to Klemperer and Meyer’s system of 
differential equations constitute a continuous SFE if supply functions are increasing 
for all realized prices, demand is concave, and if there are no profitable deviations at 
the highest realized price, because of a price cap or because competitors’ have 
sufficiently large excess capacity.  
   Finally, we would not claim that the apparent tension between tractable but 
unrealistic continuous SFEs and realistic but intractable step SFEs is the only, or even 
the main, problem in modelling electricity markets. First, there are multiple SFE if 
some offers are always accepted or never accepted. Then under reasonable conditions, 
there is a continuum of continuous SFE bounded by (in the short run) a least and most 
profitable SFE. Second, the position of the SFEs depends on the contract position of 
all the generators, and determining the choice of contracts and their impact on the 
spot market is a hard and important problem. The greater the extent of contract cover, 
the less will be the incentive for spot market manipulation (Newbery, 1995), and as 
electricity demand is very inelastic and markets typically concentrated, this is an 
important determinant of market performance. Newbery (1998) argued that these can 
be related, in that incumbents can choose contract positions to keep both the contract 
and average spot price at the entry-deterring level, thus simultaneously solving for 
prices, contract positions, and embedding the short-run SFE within a longer run 
investment and entry equilibrium. A full long-run model of the electricity market 
should also be able to investigate whether some market power is required for (or 
inimical to) adequate investment in reserve capacity to maintain adequate security of 
supply. With such a model one could also make a proper assessment of how many 
competing generators are needed to deliver a workably competitive but secure 
electricity market. 
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APPENDIX - PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS 
 
Proof of Proposition 1:  To find an equilibrium we need to determine the best 
response of firm i given its competitors’ bids. The best response necessarily satisfies a 
first-order condition for each price level, found by differentiating (2) with respect 
to and , noting that the limits are functions of and , as : jis
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From the last expression it follows that: 
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Combining (10) and (11) gives the first-order condition for step supply functions: 
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where si(ε) is given by (1) if [ ]. ,1 jj ττε −∈  
( )( ) jii s∂∂ /E sπ
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is always well-defined, as from our definitions and assumed 
restrictions on the bids it follows that and if 
□ 
0≥Δ≥Δ −jij ττ 01 ≥−≥Δ −jj τετ
jτε ∈
The first-order condition in Proposition 1 is not directly applicable to parts of 
the offer curve that are never accepted in equilibrium, i.e. for price levels pj such that 
ετ >j . Let pH be the highest price level that is realized with a positive probability. By 
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differentiating the expected profit in (3), one can show that 
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because ( ) 0=εg for εε > . Thus to maximize its expected profit a firm should offer all 
of its remaining capacity at pH. The intuition for this result is as follows: due to pro-
rata on-the-margin rationing, maximizing the supply at pH maximizes the firm’s share 
of the accepted supply at pH, and, because of the bounded range of demand shocks, 
there is no risk that an increased supply at pH will lead to a lower price for any 
realized event. Hence iHi ss = . Our discreteness and uncertainty assumptions should 
not be critical for this result. Intuitively, we expect never-accepted offers to be 
perfectly elastic in any uniform price auction with stepped supply functions and pro-
rata on the margin rationing.  
Now, consider offers that are always infra-marginal. Let pL be the lowest price 
that is realized with positive probability. Differentiate expected profit in (3): 
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because ( ) 0=εg for εε < . Hence ετ =−1L . This result makes sense intuitively. To 
increase the accepted supply with pro-rata on-the-margin rationing at the price level pL, 
infra-marginal offers that are never price-setting should be offered below pL rather than at 
pL. Again, we intuitively believe that always-accepted offers are generally offered below 
pL in any uniform price auction with stepped supply functions and a pro-rata on the 
margin rationing mechanism. 
Lemma 1 below derives a Taylor expansion of the discrete first-order 
condition - very useful when we show that discrete SFE converge to continuous SFE.   
 
Lemma 1. If the differences are of the order ∆pj, then the discrete first-order 
condition in (
j
i
j
i ss −+1
12) can approximated by the following Taylor series expansion in ∆pj: 
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Proof: Let ∆pj=∆pj+1, then the first-order condition in (12) can be written: 
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First assume that L ≤ j < H-1. Straightforward differentiation yields: 
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where the data at step j, e.g. , are deemed fixed while jis 0→Δp implies data at 
step j+1converge to their respective values at step j. The difference between  
and  is of the second-order. Thus considering the derivatives above, we get:  
j
i−Δτ
1+
−Δ jiτ
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )2pOgsCpgps jijjiijjjiji Δ+Δ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ ′−+Δ−=Γ −τττs . (14) 
Next, perform the corresponding derivation for j=H-1 where 
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The result in Lemma 1 can be used to prove the following: 
Lemma 2. Assume that the differences are of the order ∆pj The discrete first-
order equation for the highest-price step is consistent with the first-order equations for 
lower steps if and only if 
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highest-price step converges to the first-order equation for the price level pH-2. Given 
this condition, we also have from Lemma 1 that   
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In particular, this limiting condition is satisfied if  
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Summing over all firms yields: 
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Given this result we can now calculate  from (1−His 15): 
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Proof of sufficient conditions 
In both the discrete and continuous case, only non-decreasing solutions of the first-
order system can constitute valid SFE, because electricity auctions do not accept 
decreasing offers. Thus a necessary condition for an SFE is that solutions are non-
decreasing. Proposition 2 shows that being non-decreasing is also a sufficient 
condition for a discrete SFE (so the non-decreasing condition acts rather like a second 
order condition in ensuring sufficiency). Note that the result relies on Assumption 1a 
and the assumptions that , i.e. concave demand. 1+Δ≥Δ jj dd
Proof of Proposition 2 : Consider a set of non-decreasing solutions, for some price 
range [pL ,pH] to a system of discrete first-order conditions as in Proposition 1. The 
shock distribution is such that pL and pH are the lowest and highest realized prices. 
Denote the solution by { N1 sss ( (K }( ,,= . In what follows it will be shown that an 
arbitrary chosen firm i has no incentive to unilaterally deviate from the supply 
schedule { }Miii ss (K(( ,,1=s  to any { }Mis,,1 Kii s=s  given that ∆p is sufficiently small 
and that competitors stick to { }Mis−ii s−− = (K(( ,,1s . Thus { }N1 sss (K(( ,,=  constitutes a Nash 
equilibrium. Now, assume that competitors stick to { }Miii ss −−− = (K(( ,,1s
is
 and calculate the 
total differential of the expected profit of firm i for some :  
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Note that, under assumption 2, this limit result is valid also for j=H-1. For the 
solution { }Miii ss( ( (K,,1=s  we know from Lemma 1 that 
( ) ( ) .,, ,211 MLjpOsCpsp jijiijji K((( ∈∀Δ=Δ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ ′−+Δ− +−+ τ   (17) 
Using the expression above, we can deduce that: 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ....  21
1
1
HLjΔpOsCsCssp
sCpps
j
i
j
ii
j
ii
j
i
j
i
j
i
j
iij
j
i
∈∀+Δ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ′−′+−Δ
=Δ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ′−+Δ−
+
−
+
−+
τ
τ
(((
(
 (18) 
The cost function is increasing and convex by assumption. It now follows from (16) 
that for any supply schedule that differs from is is
( at some price , the 
expected profit can be increased by the following adjustment of the supply schedule 
(if the tick size is sufficiently small): 
1−∈ HLj K
1)  Marginally increase supply at each price level 1,, −∈ HLj K , for which 
j
i
j
i ss >( , because for this case (18) implies that ( )1+ Δ⎥⎦⎤ 1+−⎢⎣⎡ ′− jiij sCp τ(+Δ− jijips ≥0 if ∆p 
is sufficiently small.  
2)  Marginally decrease supply at each price level 1,, −∈ HLj K , for which 
j
i
j
i ss <( , because for this case (18) implies that ( )1+ Δ⎥⎦⎤ 1+−⎢⎣⎡ ′− jiij sCp τ(
1,
+Δ− jijips
,
≤0 if ∆p 
is sufficiently small. This analysis applies to any firm and it implies that there are no 
profitable unilateral deviations at the price levels −∈ HLj K from the equilibrium 
candidate { }N1 sss (K(( ,,= . 
The next step is to prove that there are no profitable unilateral deviations for 
the other price levels either. According to Assumption 1a there are no profitable 
deviations in which the supply at pH (and higher price levels) is less than maximum 
capacity. It is possible to push the market price below pL, the lowest realized price in 
the potential equilibrium. However, as shown below such deviations would not be 
profitable. Equation (5) and the assumption that  together imply that 1+Δ≥Δ jj dd
Ljji
j
i ≤Δ≥Δ −+−  allfor  1 ττ (( . Thus it follows from (17) that 
( ) ( ) . allfor  ,lim 211 LjpOsCpsp jijiijjiM <Δ<Δ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ ′−+Δ− +−+∞→ τ((  
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The probability density ( )jijisg −+τ(  is positive for some j < L only if jiji ss <( . Hence, 
( ) ( ) ( ) .0such that  , allfor  ,lim 211 >+<Δ<Δ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ ′−+Δ− −+−+∞→ jijijijiijjiM sgLjpOsCpps ττ ((  (19) 
It now follows from (16) and (19) that for any supply schedule  that differs from is is
(  
at some price j < L, ( ) 0such that >+ −jijisg τ(  the expected profit can be increased by 
marginally decreasing  if ∆p is sufficiently small.  This analysis applies to any firm 
and it accordingly implies that there are no profitable unilateral deviations at price 
levels j < L from the equilibrium candidate 
j
is
{ }N1 sss (K(( ,,= . We have now shown this 
result for every price level. Accordingly, we can conclude that { }Miii ss (K(( ,,1=s  
globally maximizes the expected profit of firm i and that { }Ns1ss (K(( ,,=  constitutes a 
Nash equilibrium. □  
 
 Proposition 3 states that a set of increasing solutions to the continuous first-
order conditions is a sufficient condition for supply function equilibrium if 
assumption 1b is satisfied and the demand curve is concave.  
 
Proof of Proposition 3:  Let X be a potential equilibrium, i.e. all SFs are non-
decreasing and satisfy the continuous f.o.c. in (6) in the whole price-setting region, 
Consider an arbitrary firm i. Assume that its competitors follow the potential 
equilibrium strategy. The question is whether it will be a best response of firm i to do 
the same. The profit of producer i for the outcome ε is given by 
( ). ,ba
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ). , pSpDCppSpDp XiiXii −− −+−−+= εεεπ  
Hence 
 ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )( )[ ] ( ) ( ) .  ', pSpDpSpDCppSpD
p
p X
i
X
ii
X
i
i
−−− −++−+′−′−=∂
∂ εεεπ   (20) 
From the first-order condition in (6) it is known that  
( ) ( )[ ] ( )( )[ ] ( ) [ ]bappSpSCppSpD XiXiiXi ,0' ∈∀=+′−′− − . 
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Subtracting this expression from (20) yields: 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]. ,  
',
εεε
εεπ
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i
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−44 344 21
  (21) 
Due to monotonicity of the supply functions we know that ( ) ( ) 0≥′−′− pDpS Xi and that 
( ) ( )Xii SpSp ≤ ⇔≥⇔ Xii SS ( ) ( ). Xiiii SCSC ′≥′  
Thus for every ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] [ ]bappSp XXi ,, =∈ εε  we can conclude from (21) that 
( )
0
, ≥∂
∂
p
Sii επ  if  ( ) ( )Xii SpSp ≤  and 
( )
0
, ≤∂
∂
p
Sii επ  if  ( ) ( )Xii SpSp ≥ . 
Hence, given and ε, the profit of firm i is pseudo-concave in the price range 
 and the profit maximum is given by the first-order condition if prices are 
restricted to this range. The next step in the proof is to rule out profitable deviations 
outside this price range. According to Assumption 1b there are no profitable 
deviations in which the supply at b (and higher prices) is less than maximum capacity. 
It is possible to push market prices below a, but as will be shown such deviations will 
be unprofitable. The assumptions in (
( )pS Xi−
[ )ba,
8) imply that all supply functions of the potential 
equilibrium are perfectly inelastic below a. This assumption and concavity of the 
demand curve implies that ( ) ( ){ } 0' ≤′− −
dp
pSpDd Xi if p ≤ a. Thus 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )( )[ ]
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
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Hence, given that competitors stick to their potential equilibrium strategies , 
the profit function is concave in the range
( )pS Xi−
( )[ ]aSC ii ,′ . Offering supply below marginal 
cost can never be profit maximizing. Thus we can conclude that ( )pS Xi must be a best 
response to . This is true for any firm and we can conclude that X is an 
equilibrium. □ 
( )pS Xi−
 
Proof of convergence 
Lemma 3 below states that the system of first-order conditions implied by Proposition 
1 has a unique solution for the price level pj-1 if jpΔ  is sufficiently small and if 
supplies for the two previous steps, pj and pj+1, are known and satisfy certain 
properties and if producers never bid below their marginal cost. We will later use 
Lemma 3 iteratively to ensures that we will be able to find unique solutions to the 
discrete first-order condition for multiple price levels under some specified 
circumstances.  
 
Lemma 3. For a sufficiently small local tick-size Δpj= Δpj+1 , assume that the known 
supplies at price levels pj+1 and pj are given by a pair of differentiable vector 
functions  and ( ){ }N
ij
j
i ps 1
1
=
+ Δ ( ){ N
ij
j
i ps 1=Δ
NK
} . It is assumed that there exists δ > 0, s.t. 
 and ( )s ji  01 ∀>≥+ δ iCp ij 11 =′−+ ( ) NisCp jiij K1 0 =∀>≥′− δ . We also 
assume a positive constant K can be found such that ( ) ( ) jj pKp Δ≤jijji sps Δ−Δ≤ +10 . 
Under these circumstances, there exists a unique differentiable vector function 
that together with({ jji ps 1− Δ )}Ni 1= ( ){ }jji ps Δ N 1=i and ( ){ }Nijji ps 11 =+ Δ satisfy the first-order 
condition in Proposition 1 for the price level j.  
Proof: We want to determine ( ){ N
ij
j
i ps 1
1
=
− Δ
jp
} , i.e. a set of solutions for price level j-1 as 
a function of the local tick-sizeΔ . The implicit function Γ is defined by the first-
order condition in Proposition 1: 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) .0
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εετ
εττε
εετ
τετετττs
 (22) 
Note that τj+1, τj, and indirectly depend on1+−
j
iτ ji−τ jpΔ and that this dependence is given 
by and( ){ }N
ij
j
i ps 1=Δ ( ){ }ijp N1=Δjis 1+ , whereas the functions ( )jj pΔ−1τ and ( )jji pΔ−− 1τ are 
unknown.   
The first step in the application of the implicit function theorem is to fix a 
point for which (22) is satisfied for all firms. This is straightforward, because it is 
easy to show that is a solution to (ji
j
i ss =−1 22) when 0=Δ jp . The next step is to prove 
that the Jacobian ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
Γ∂
−1j
i
j
i
s
is invertible at this fixed point. By differentiating (22), it is 
straightforward to show that: 
( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
( ) ( )∫∫ −− Δ
−
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ′−−Δ
−−Δ″=∂
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−
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εττετετ 11 2
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Evaluating the integrals in the limit as we get closer to the fixed point yields 
 
( ) ( )
0
2
lim 11 <
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ′−
−=∂
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−
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−
j
i
j
iij
j
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ss
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Similarly, 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )∫
∫
−
−
Δ
−−Δ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ′−+
Δ
−−Δ
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
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i
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τετετετ
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1
3
1
4
12
1
2
 
and 
 . 0lim 11 =∂
Γ∂
−→− j
j
i
ss ji
j
i τ      (24) 
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For convenience let 1−∂
Γ∂= j
j
i
i τα  and 11 −−− ∂
Γ∂+∂
Γ∂= j
i
j
i
j
j
i
i ττβ .  We know that 
i11 ατ =∂
Γ∂=∂
Γ∂
−− j
j
i
j
i
j
j
s
 and that ik
s ji
j
i
j
j
i
j
k
j
i ≠∀=∂
Γ∂+∂
Γ∂=∂
Γ∂
−
−
−−  i111 βττ . Accordingly, it follows 
from (23) and (24) that at the fixed point when 0=Δ jp  we have that  
  ii αβ <  and  0<iβ .   (25) 
The Jacobian matrix of the functions is: jN
j ΓΓ K1
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
⎡
=
NNN
J
αββ
βαβ
ββα
K
MMM
K
K
222
111
1 . 
To verify that the matrix is invertible, we want to prove that its determinant is non-
zero. The non-zero property of the determinant is unaltered if we divide each row i by 
the factor 0<iβ .  
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
⎡
=
NN
J
βα
βα
βα
/11
1/1
11/
22
11
2
K
MMM
K
K
. 
The determinant cannot acquire a (but may lose its) non-zero property if one row is 
replaced by a linear combination of the rows. In the next step, each row (except for 
the last row) is subtracted by the row below.  
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
⎡
−
−−
−−
=
NN
J
βα
βα
βαβα
βαβα
/111
01/00
0/11/0
00/11/
33
3322
2211
3
K
MMMM
K
K
K
 
It can now be shown that (∑
= ≠
−∏=
N
j
kk
jk
J
1
3 1/ βα ). By means of (25) we are now ready 
to conclude that 03 ≠J . Consequently, we can also conclude that 02 ≠J  and that 
 42
01 ≠J . Thus the Jacobian matrix of the functions   with respect to  is 
invertible at the fixed point. Moreover, as
j
N
j ΓΓ K1 1−jks
( ){ }N
ij
j
i ps =Δ 1 and ( ){ }Nijp 1=Δ
j
i Ks ≤−
( )
j
is
1+
j
is≤ +10
( )
are assumed to 
be differentiable, it is straightforward to verify that the functions  are 
continuously differentiable in Δpj. Thus we can conclude from the Implicit Function 
Theorem that for sufficiently small Δpj, there is a unique and differentiable solution to 
the discrete equation in Proposition 
j
NΓjΓ K1
jp
( )
( )
1 around the fixed point given 
by and .  ji
j
i ss =−1 0=Δ jp
In the final step, solutions not in the neighbourhood of the fixed point are 
ruled out for sufficiently small Δpj. The property that , for some 
finite constant K implies that the integral
Δ
( )dg ε∫
− ⎢⎣
⎡
j
j
p j
τ
τ 1 Δ
Δ
⎥⎦
⎤ −ji
τ
ετ − −
j
jτ
2
1′− sC ii ε ε  
must be of the order ∆pj if a vector{ }Ni 11 =jis − is to satisfy the first-order condition in 
Proposition 1. Together with the assumption that marginal costs are non-decreasing 
and the constraint that ( )sCp jiij ≥′− N
− jiji ss
i K1 0 =∀>δ , it follows that any solution 
vector{ must have the property that differences are of the order ∆pj, 
otherwise the first-order condition cannot be satisfied for each firm. Thus solutions 
not in the neighbourhood of the fixed point can be ruled out, ensuring a unique 
solution to the discrete equation in Proposition 
}N1=ijis 1− 1−
1 for sufficiently small Δpj.   □ 
Lemma 4. Under Assumption 2, the difference equation in Proposition 1 is consistent 
with the continuous equation in (7) if ({ )}Ni 1=i ps) is bounded and 
.   ( )psC ii )′− ( ) Np K1=i 0∀>≥ δ
Proof: A discrete approximation of an ordinary differential equation is consistent if the 
local truncation error is infinitesimally small when the step length is infinitesimally small 
(LeVeque, 2007). The local truncation error is the discrepancy between the continuous 
slope and its discrete estimate when discrete values are replaced with samples of the 
continuous solution
j
is
( )jpis) .  The continuous first-order condition in (7) and the 
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constraint , imply that( )( ) 0>≥′− δpsCp ii ) ( ){ }Nii ps 1=′) are bounded. Thus differences 
( ) ( )ji psji ps )) −+1  will be of the order ∆pj.  Hence, we can use the Taylor approximation 
from Lemma 1 to approximate the first-order condition in (12): 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 02 =Δ+⎥⎦⎤ +Δ⎢⎣⎡ ′− − jjijiij pOsC τ+Δ− jjij pgsp τ − jiji sgτ . 
Note that this approximation is valid for j=H-1 as well if assumption 2 is satisfied. We 
have assumed that g is bounded away from zero. Thus  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) 02 =Δ+⎢⎣⎡ Δ−Δ⎥⎦⎤′− jjjiij pOdsCp+Δ− jij sp −jis .  (26) 
This lemma considers prices for which mark-ups are bounded away from zero. Hence, 
(26) can be rewritten as: 
 
( )
( ) 0=Δ− ji d
2
Δ+Δ −jj
i
j s
s
p
′−
+Δ−
ij
j
ij
Cp
Osp
.    (27) 
Summing the corresponding expressions of all firms and then dividing by N-1 yields: 
( )
( )
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pOsΔs .   (28) 
By subtracting (27) from (28) followed by some rearrangements we obtain: 
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We know from the definition of the demand in the continuous system 
that
j
j
pj
pd
j
= →Δlim' p
d
Δ
Δ
0
. Hence,  
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. (30) 
It remains to show that if and in the right hand side of (jis
j
ks 30) are replaced by samples 
of the continuous solution ( )jis p)  and ( )jk ps)  then the right hand side converges to . 
 But this follows from (
( )ji ps ′)
7).  Thus the local truncation error is zero and we can conclude 
that the discrete system is a consistent approximation of the continuous system. □ 
We use this consistency property when proving convergence below. Recall that L 
and H are the lowest and highest price indices, j, such that price pj occurs with positive 
probability, and varies with M (and the initial or boundary conditions). 
Proposition 4 Let ( ){ }psi)  be a solution on the interval [a ,b] that satisfies Assumption 
3.  Consider the discrete first-order system (in Proposition 1) with initial conditions 
and 1ˆ −His i
H
i ss =ˆ  for each i.  If as M → ∞ we have  and that converges to 
ki=
bpH → 1ˆ −His
( )bsi)  in a way consistent with Assumption 2, then for sufficiently large M there 
exists a unique discrete solution { }Nijis 1=) . As the number of steps grows (M → ∞),  
{ }Nijis =1)  converges to ({ psi )})  in the interval [a ,b].  
Proof: Lemma 4 states that the discrete equation is a consistent approximation of the 
continuous equation. To show that the discrete solution converges to the continuous 
solution, we need to prove that the discrete solution exists and is stable, i.e. the error 
does not explode as the number of steps increases without limit.  The proof is inspired 
by LeVeque’s (2007) convergence proof for general one-step methods.  
Define the vector of global errors at the price pj, ( )jjj pssE )−=  and the 
corresponding vector for the local truncation error: 
( ) ( ) ( )ji
j
jijij
i psp
psps ′−Δ
−= + )
))
1υ . 
It is useful to introduce a Lipschitz constant λ (LeVeque, 2007). Let it be some constant 
that satisfies the inequality10 
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 (31) 
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Such a Lipschitz constant exists since we have assumed the mark-up, which appears in 
the denominator of each fraction in (31), is bounded away from zero, the cost function is 
twice continuously differentiable, and the prices and corresponding strategy values are 
bounded. For sufficiently small ∆p, λ puts a bound on the sensitivity of the vector sj-1 to 
small changes in the solution of the previous step. It is also useful to introduce another 
constant κ, such that 
 46
( ) ( )
( )( )
( )
( )( ) ( ).,  '1
1
1
' bap
psCp
ps
NpsCp
ps
N
pd
k kk
k
ii
i ∈∀<−−+′−
+− ∑ κ)
)
)
)
  (32) 
The constant κ will bound the difference between the vectors sj and sj-1. Again we know 
that such a constant will exist, because the continuous solutions are bounded and mark-
ups are bounded away from zero on the interval.  
One problem with the highest price step is that differences  are finite 
also for infinitesimally small ∆p, which makes it problematic to use Lemma 
1−− HiHi ss
3. But there 
is a way around this problem. Assumption 2 and Lemma 2 imply that 1ˆ −− Hτε  and 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )∫− ⎟⎟⎠
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iiiH  are both of the order ∆p.  It is straightforward 
to verify that this condition can replace the condition that differences s  are of the 
order ∆p in Lemma 
1−H
is−Hi
3. Thus it follows that { }NiHis 2 =− 1 can be uniquely determined if ∆p is 
sufficiently small. For sufficiently small ∆p, it now follows from (29) and (31) that the 
global error satisfies the following inequality:  
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Thus if ∆p is sufficiently small, so that the initial error ∞
−1HE and the local 
truncation error 1Hυ − are small enough, then ∞
−2HE is sufficiently small. It now follows 
from the assumed properties of the continuous solution that  and 
that . We know from (
021 ≥− −− HiHi ss
( ) NisCp HiiH K1 022 =∀>≥′− −− δ 29) and (32) that 
                                                                                                                                                        
j
iNi
j EE
≤≤∞
=
1
max10 Note that ∞⋅ is the max-norm, i.e.  (LeVeque, 2007). 
pss Hi
H
i Δ≤− −− κ21 . Thus if ∆p is sufficiently small, then the argument for the vector sH-2 
can be repeated iteratively to prove that the vector can be uniquely 
determined and that  
3,..., −=∀ HLkks
( ) ( )
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Let { } 1max max −=∞= H knk nυυ . From the inequality in (33), we can show by induction that 
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 (34) 
In the limit as then0→Δp 0→∞−1HE , (because of Lemma 01max →+Lυ 4), 
, and ( )( ) abpLH −→Δ− ( )abLH ep −− →Δ λλ+1 . Thus from (34) 0→∞kE  when 
, proving that the discrete solution converges to the continuous one. □  0→Δp
Given the results of Propositions 2-4 we are now ready to prove Theorem 1:  
Proof of Theorem 1: Part (a) is a restatement of Proposition 3. To show part (b), 
given Propositions 4 and 2, it is sufficient to verify that Assumption 1a holds and to 
show that each player’s discrete strategy – that exists and is convergent to the 
continuous strategy – satisfies . Convergence implies 
that
pWss ji
j
i Δ≤−≤ +10
p
ss ij
i
j
Δ
−+1 converges to  if pj →p, uniformly in [a,b]. We know that  is 
bounded (due to the positive mark-up assumption) and strictly positive, uniformly in 
[a,b]. Thus  . Convergence of competitors’ supply curves implies 
that the difference between a producer’s profits in the discrete and continuous system 
will converge to zero, and this is also true for all possible deviations of the producer. 
Hence, in the limit, assumption 1a is satisfied if assumption 1b is satisfied.   □ 
( )psi′)
pWΔ≤
( )psi′)
ss ji
j
i −≤ +10
The result below ensures that whenever a discrete equilibrium exists in the 
limit, when the number of steps becomes arbitrarily large, then there always exists a 
corresponding continuous equilibrium.  This reverses the implication of Theorem 1, 
and thereby establishes that the family of discrete NE is, asymptotically, in one-to-one 
correspondence with the family of continuous equilibria.  
 Proposition 5. Assume for a sufficiently large number of steps M that there exists a 
discrete solution { }Nijis 1=) that is a segment of a discrete SFE. The solution satisfies 
Assumption 1a, Assumption 2 and the inequality  (where W is some 
positive constant). Moreover it is stable, so that it converges to a set of continuous 
functions 
pWss ji
j
i Δ≤−≤ +10
( ){ Nii ps } 1~ =  on [a, b], where Lp pa  lim0→Δ= and Hp pb  lim0→Δ= .  Then ( ){ }Nii ps 1~ =  is a 
segment of a continuous SFE, if  ( ){ }Nip 1is~ =
i 0 =∀>δ
 is increasing in the interval [a, b] and if it 
satisfies the property  in this interval.   ( )psC ii ~′( ) ≥ NK1p −
Proof: Given the assumed properties of ( ){ }Nii ps 1~ = and that ( ){ }Nii ps 1~ = satisfies the discrete 
first-order condition in Proposition 1 when Δp → 0, it follows from Assumption 2 and 
Lemma 4 that ( ){ }Nii ps 1~ = will satisfy the continuous first-order condition in (6).  
Convergence of competitors’ supply curves implies that the difference between a 
producer’s profits in the discrete and continuous system will converge to zero, and 
this is also true for all possible deviations of the producer. Hence, in the limit, 
assumption 1b is satisfied if assumption 1a is satisfied. As ( ){ }Nii ps 1~ = is a set of 
increasing functions in the interval [a, b], it now follows from Proposition 3 that 
( ){ }Nii ps 1~ = is a segment of a continuous SFE.  □ 
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